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INTRODUCTION 
The State does not wish to reply to the statement of 
issues, statement of the case, or statement of facts in 
defendants1 responsive brief. There appear to be no significant 
disputes between the parties in those areas. The State wishes 
only to note as an additional fact that the trial court 
considered the preliminary hearing transcript, in conjunction 
with the testimony received at the suppression hearing, in 
rendering its suppression order (S.H. 130-31; Transcript of 
Courtfs Ruling on Motion to Suppress at 3). The preliminary 
hearing testimony paralleled, for the most part, that given at 
the suppression hearing. 
The State will reply to the six points of argument in 
defendants1 brief. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY TQ RESPONDENTS1 PQINT I 
THE REASONABLE SUSPICION TEST APPLIED TO THE 
STOP OP DEFENDANTS. 
In its opening brief the State challenged the trial 
court1s suppression ruling on the ground that the court had 
applied an incorrect standard of law in holding that the stop of 
defendants1 vehicle was unlawful. In their responsive brief 
defendants agree that the "reasonable suspicion" testf not a 
"probable cause" test, applied to the stopf but argue that the 
court applied the correct standard. However, such a conclusion 
ignores the plain language of the suppression order. The court 
stated that "there were no articulable facts as a basis or 
probable cause for said officers to make the initial stop of the 
Idlefendants" (emphasis added). That language does not reflect 
an application of the reasonable suspicion test; rather, it 
indicates that the trial court believed probable causef which 
requires a greater degree of certaintyf was necessary before the 
officers could lawfully stop defendants to inquire about their 
citizenship. 
Defendants1 additional discussion about the probable 
cause requirement attached to the search of an automobile is not 
pertinent to the issue raised by the State. The sole basis for 
the suppression order was the illegality of the initial stop. 
The court did notf as an alternative basis for its ruling, assume 
the legality of the stop and find that the officers lacked 
probable cause to search the vehicle defendants were driving. 
Accordingly, the Court should not reach this question. If the 
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Court were to reverse the trial court1s suppression order because 
an incorrect standard was applied in ruling that the stop was 
unlawfulr defendants would have an opportunity to argue the 
probable cause/automobile search issue in another motion to 
suppress. 
Finallyf given this Court1s recently expressed concern 
about the failure of the parties to brief relevant state 
constitutional questions in criminal casesf particularly in the 
area of search and seizure/ £££ State v. Earl, 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 4, P.2d (1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 
(Utah 1985) (Zimmerman/ J.f concurring), the State will first 
address the question of whether the investigatory stop should be 
discussed in terms of the state constitution in this caser and 
then the further question of whether the stop issue should be 
analyzed any differently under article 1/ section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution/ even though defendants have apparently limited 
their challenge to one under the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
When criminal defendants attack the admissibility of 
evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the 
fourth amendment, and do not also argue that a state 
constitutional violation occurred/ this Court should not address 
the state constitutional question. ££. State v. Bishop. 31 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9/ 17f P.2d (1986) (Durham/ J.f concurring) 
(where Justice Durham suggests that/ even in the absence of 
briefing by the parties/ the Court could address an issue under 
the state constitution SJJ& sponte). The better approach is for 
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the Court to request addit ional br ie f ing on the subject / i f i t i s 
i n c l i n e d to reach the s t a t e law i s s u e . See s t a t e v . Jewett . 500 
A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) , c i t e d with approval in fiaxLr 30 Utah Adv. 
Rep. a t 4 . This i s par t i cu lar ly true in the search and se izure 
arena. Although the Court has recent ly suggested that a r t i c l e I , 
s e c t i o n 14 could be construed to expand c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protect ion 
beyond tha t mandated by the United S ta te s Supreme Court under the 
fourth amendment, £axlr 30 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 4; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
271-73 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring) , the Court has t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
construed the s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l standard and the fourth 
amendment, which t e x t u a l l y are nearly i d e n t i c a l , as providing the 
same scope of pro tec t ion . £££ , e . g . . S tate v. Cr i sco la . 21 Utah 
2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); S ta te v . Lopes. 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 
1976) . This may exp la in , to a cer ta in e x t e n t , the absence of any 
independent d i scuss ion of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 by criminal 
defense at torneys and the S t a t e 1 s at torneys when search and 
se i zure i s s u e s are argued before the t r i a l court and t h i s Court. 
Because the re so lu t ion of search and se izure i s s u e s on s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds would mark a c lear departure from t h i s 
Court's h i s t o r i c re l iance on federal precedents under the fourth 
amendment to decide those i s s u e s , £££ , e . g . . State v . Gal legos . 
712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); State v. Harris , 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 
1983); S ta te v . Romero. 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) , the Court 
should approach t h i s new t e r r i t o r y caut ious ly , and only with the 
benef i t of br ie f ing from the p a r t i e s . Because defendants l imi t ed 
t h e i r motion to suppress to an a l l eged fourth amendment v i o l a t i o n 
and the t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing was s imi lar ly l imi t ed , the 
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suppression issue should only be analyzed under the federal 
cons t i t u t ion . 
Even if the Court were incl ined to analyze the 
inves t iga tory stop i ssue in defendants1 case under a r t i c l e I , 
sect ion 14, the applicable federal t e s t and the r e s u l t the Sta te 
argues for should both be adopted. The reasonable suspicion t e s t 
for inves t iga tory stops r e f l e c t s a reasonable and workable 
approach to the question of whether a pa r t i cu la r stop i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I t s t r i k e s an appropriate balance between the 
promotion of l eg i t imate governmental i n t e r e s t s and the 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r e s t in being free from in t rus ions on 
fundamental cons t i tu t iona l r i g h t s . I l l i n o i s v. LaFayette, 462 
U.S. 640f 644 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 
(1979). And, the circumstances present in the ins tan t case were 
suf f ic ien t to give r i s e to the reasonable suspicion required for 
the stop of defendants. Although in other instances i t may be 
appropr ia te , there i s no good reason here to construe a r t i c l e I , 
sect ion 14 more narrowly (in terms of permissible police conduct) 
than the fourth amendment has been in te rp re ted , so as to 
undermine the reasonable suspicion analys is se t for th in the 
S t a t e ' s opening br ief . See State v. Ouinn, 50 Or. App. 3 83, 623 
P.2d 630, 638-39 (1981); S ta te v. Westlund. 75 Or. App. 43, 705 
P.2d 208, 216-17 (Or. App. 1985) (Van Hoomissen, J . , concurring 
in p a r t ; d issent ing in p a r t ) , review granted/ 710 p.2d 146; jSi&tfi 
v . Caraher. 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 948 (1982) (c i t ing cases 
where the s t a t e court recognized the p o s s i b i l i t y of expanding 
protect ion under the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion beyond t h a t required 
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under t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n but dec l ined t o t ake such a s t e p 
i n the given c a s e ) . £f . Reeves v . S t a t e , 599 P.2d 727, 734 
(Alaska 1979) ( cons t ru ing A l a s k a 1 s sea rch and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n 
t o provide broader p r o t e c t i o n than t h e f o u r t h amendment); Stephan 
v . S t a t e , 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (holding t h a t unexcused 
f a i l u r e t o e l e c t r o n i c a l l y record c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n 
conducted in a p lace of d e t e n t i o n v i o l a t e s a s u s p e c t ' s r i g h t t o 
due p rocess under the Alaska Cons t i t u t i on—even though t h i s was 
unnecessary t o s a t i s f y t h e due p rocess requirement of t he f e d e r a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ) . In s h o r t f t h e r easonab le s u s p i c i o n t e s t and t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t s t anda rd proposed by t h e S t a t e i n de fendan t s ' 
case provide s o c i e t y with e f f e c t i v e law enforcement wi thou t 
compromising an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o be f r e e from unreasonable 
s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s under a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 14 . 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 POINT I I 
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS, THE TRIAL 
COURT, IN LIGHT OF STATE V, VALDEZ. 689 P.2d 
1334 (UTAH 1984) f INCORRECTLY RULED THAT 
DEFENDANTS HAD STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THEY WERE DRIVING. 
Defendants argue t h a t t he S t a t e mi scons t rues s t a t e v . 
Va ldez . 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) , in a rguing t h a t t h e t r i a l 
cou r t e r roneous ly r u l e d t h a t defendants had s t and ing to cha l l enge 
t h e sea rch of t h e v e h i c l e they were d r i v i n g . However, they f a i l 
t o p rov ide any meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n s between the f a c t s of t h e i r 
case and those p r e s e n t in Valdez . The po in t of t h e S t a t e ' s 
argument i s t h a t , i n l i g h t of Valdez . the cour t could not have 
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properly found standing on the bas is t h a t i t d id . l This i s not 
to say tha t standing could not have been found on an a l t e rna t ive 
ground. £££, e . g . . State v . Scot t . 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 
9 8 5 , 987 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , appeal a f t e r remand. 68 Or. App. 3 8 6 , 681 P.2d 
1188, review denied. 685 P.2d 998 (1984) (passenger in vehic le 
had standing to object to evidence as f r u i t of an i l l e g a l s top, 
even though he may not have had a recognizable expectation of 
privacy in vehic le i t s e l f ) ; People v. Flowers. I l l 111. App. 3d 
348, 67 111. Dec. 203, 444 N.E.2d 242, 246 (1982) (dr iver , who 
did not own vehicle and had no leg i t imate expectat ion of privacy 
in i t , could never theless challenge the evidence seized on the 
ground tha t the stop of the vehic le was i l l e g a l ) . 
1
 The Valdez holding l o g i c a l l y applies to both a driver and 
passenger in a vehic le which nei ther of them own—as was the 
s i t ua t i on in defendants1 case. As i t r e l a t e s to a passenger, 
Valdez has considerable support in the case law. E.g . . United 
States v. P o r t i l l o , 633 P.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir . 1980), c e r t . 
Ifel l i£d, 450 U . S . 1 0 4 3 , appeal a f t e r remand. 699 F.2d 461 
(passenger had no standing to challenge search of paper bag in 
vehic le 1 s trunk when stop was lawful) ; McCraney v. S t a t e , 381 
So.2d 102, 105-06 (Ala. Cr. App. 1980) (defendant, who was 
passenger in car lawfully stopped, lacked standing to challenge 
search of t runk) . However, the S ta te must concede tha t there i s 
subs tan t i a l au thor i ty contrary to Valdez on the question of 
whether a d r iver , who has the vehic le owner's permission to 
possess and drive i t , has standing to challenge a search of the 
veh ic le when a lawful s top i s made. E .g . . P o r t i l l o . 633 F.2d a t 
1317; United Sta tes v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir . 1979), ££L±. 
denied. 444 U.S. 955; Stone v. S ta te , 162 Ga. App. 654, 292 
S.E.2d 525 (1982) . 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ARGUE MIRANDA 
VIOLATIONS AS A BASIS FOR SUPPRESSION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING 
THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Defendants argue that the officers1 failure to advise 
them of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 436 
(1966), before eliciting incriminating statements from them about 
their citizenship is another ground upon which the trial court 
could have suppressed the challenged evidence. Howeverf 
defendants never asserted this particular ground for suppression 
in the lower court; therefore, the Court should not consider it 
on appeal. State v. Carterf 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). 
Furthermore, a Miranda violation was not a basis for the 
suppression order. If the trial court's order were reversed, 
defendants would not be precluded from raising the Miranda issue 
upon remand. 
REPLY TQ RESPONDENTS' POINTS IV AND V 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 12 (g) IS BOTH A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND DESIRABLE COMPONENT OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAWS IN THIS STATE. 
The State1s opening brief adequately presents the 
argument that Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) is both a constitutional and 
desirable component of the criminal laws in this statef and 
therefore the State will only briefly respond to defendants1 
argument in opposition. As defendants1 brief illustratesf there 
is room for honest disagreement between the parties about the 
wisdom of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the 
warrantless search or seizure situation. However, the scheme in 
Utah—i.e., Rule 12(g) operating in conjunction with UTAH CODE 
-8-
ANN. §§ 7 8-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 1985)—represents an excellent 
legislative effort to address a growing dissatisfaction with 
blind application of the exclusionary rule. It provides an 
appropriate modification of that rule which, contrary to 
defendants1 assertion/ does not contravene federal or state 
constitutional law. It is noteworthy that this Court itself, 
prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. 
QhL&, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which extended the exclusionary rule 
to state criminal prosecutions, declined to adopt that rule, 
holding that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search 
or seizure was still admissible against the accused. State v. 
Zalx, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 (1960); State V. Aime, 62 Utah 
476, 220 P. 704 (1923). Although a return to the total rejection 
of the exclusionary rule enunciated in Fair and Aims is not 
appropriate, those cases provide the foundation for serious 
reconsideration of this Court1s faithful reliance of the 
federally fashioned exclusionary rule as the only remedy for a 
violation of the fourth amendment or article I, section 14 in a 
criminal case. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT VI 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ARGUE IN THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT THE BORDER PATROL OFFICERS WERE 
NOT AUTHORIZED TO STOP VEHICLES IN UTAH, THEY 
ARE PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT AS A BASIS 
FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE CHALLENGED EVIDENCE. 
In their responsive brief defendants advance as an 
alternative basis for suppression of the challenged evidence the 
contention that the federal border patrol officers involved in 
the stop of their vehicle were not authorized to make vehicle 
-9-
stops in Utah. Again, defendants never asserted this particular 
ground for suppression in the trial court; and, the court did not 
include it as a basis for its suppression order. Therefore, this 
Court should not consider it on appeal. State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d at 660. Defendants1 argument could, of course, be presented 
to the trial court if the suppression order is reversed and the 
case remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing replies to defendants1 points 
and the arguments set forth in the State1s opening brief, this 
Court should reverse the trial courtfs suppression order and 
remand the case with an order to allow admission of the 
challenged evidence, subject to alternative arguments for 
suppression that may be presented by defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I day of May, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON / 
Assistant Attorney General 
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